This paper studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a natural measure of "party strength" based on the sizes and intensities of a party's loyal voter segments and demonstrate how party behavior varies with the two parties' strengths.
Introduction
In the model of redistributive politics, political parties compete for representation in a legislature by simultaneously announcing binding commitments as to how they will allocate a budget across voters. Each voter votes for the party offering the highest level of utility, and each party's payoff is its representation in the legislature, which under proportional representation is equal to the fraction of votes received by that party. Originally formulated by Myerson (1993) , the model has served as a fundamental tool in the analysis of electoral competition. In recent years, the model has attracted renewed interest through its application to the study of the inequality created by political competition (Laslier (2002) , Laslier and Picard (2002) ), incentives for generating budget deficits (Lizzeri (2002) ), inefficiency of public good provision (Lizzeri and Persico (2001, 2002) ), and campaign spending regulation (Sahuguet and Persico (2006) ).
This paper extends the model of redistributive politics to allow for heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties and shows that this has important implications for the nature of redistributive competition. Voters are distinguished by the party with which they identify, if any, and the intensity of their attachment, or "loyalty," to that party. We assume that parties are able to perfectly discriminate across voters by their party affiliation and the intensity of their attachment (including the set of "swing voters" who have no attachment to either party).
Parties compete by simultaneously announcing offer distributions to each of the identified voter segments. When integrated over all segments, each party's offer distributions must satisfy a common aggregate budget constraint. 1 As in Myerson, each voter is assumed to vote (sincerely) for the party that offers the higher level of utility which, in our model, reflects both the transfer offered and the voter's loyalty.
We completely characterize the unique Nash equilibrium of this model and, explore its qualitative nature. 2 In equilibrium, within any given voter segment, the expected transfers 1 As in Myerson (1993) each offer distribution is a probability distribution over the nonnegative real numbers with the measure over each interval interpreted as the fraction of the particular loyal voter segment for whom the party's transfer has value in that interval. Since we assume a continuum of voters in each segment and offers that are independent across voters (each voter takes an independent draw from the offer distribution) we may appeal to Judd (1985) in assuming that the aggregate budget constraint holds with probability one and not just in expectation. 2 As formulated, our game is constant sum, so the parties' equilibrium strategies are maximin strategies.
from the two parties' offer distributions are identical. However, we find that voters pay a price for being loyal to a party. For a given distribution of voters' attachments to political parties, the expected transfer that voters receive is strictly decreasing in the voters' intensity of attachment (regardless of party affiliation). This monotonicity of transfers also translates into a monotonicity of utility. Although the expected utility provided by a party's redistribution schedule is identical for all of its loyal voter segments and equal to the expected utility that the swing voters receive from each party's redistribution schedule, the expected utility that a party's loyal voters receive from the opposition party's redistribution schedule is decreasing in the voters' level of attachment.
Moreover, we find that the parties have an incentive to target or "poach" a subset of the opposition party's loyal voters, in an effort to induce those voters to vote against their party.
By "poaching" we mean a strategy of targeting each segment of the opposition party's loyal voters with a redistribution schedule that "freezes out" a portion of the segment with a zero transfer, but gives the remaining voters in the segment non-zero transfers which are higher in expectation than the opposition party's offers to the same segment. This captures the notion that a party may try to selectively induce a strict subset of the opposition's loyal voters to defect by offering them a higher transfer.
To facilitate our analysis we also construct a natural measure of "party strength" based on both the sizes and intensities of a party's loyal voter segments and show how party behavior varies with the two parties' strengths. We demonstrate that each party's vote share is increasing (decreasing) in its own (opponent's) party strength. We also find that as the opposition party's strength increases, a party's equilibrium redistribution schedule freezes out a larger set of the opposition's loyal voters and gives a higher expected transfer to those not frozen out. The party's own loyal voter segments also receive a higher expected transfer. Although it is not obvious from these effects, the level of inequality in utilities (as measured by the Gini-coefficient) from a party's equilibrium redistribution schedule is also increasing in the opposition party's strength.
As is common in models of electoral competition, the policy implemented by the legislature is assumed to be a probabilistic compromise of the parties' equilibrium redistribution schedules. 3 The probability that a party's schedule is adopted is proportional to the size of its legislative contingent. 4 From the characterization of equilibrium described above, it immediately follows that for a given distribution of voters' attachments to the political parties, the equilibrium expected transfers and resulting expected utilities from the implemented policy are highest for swing voters and strictly decreasing in the intensity of attachment. 5 Moreover, defining the "level of partisanship" as the sum of the parties' strengths, we find that partisanship preserving transformations of the electorate that increase the strength of party i at the expense of party −i result in party i's loyal voters receiving higher expected utilities and party −i's loyal voters receiving lower expected utilities from the implemented policy.
We also develop a measure of "political polarization" that is increasing in the sum and symmetry of the parties' strengths and show that the expected ex-post inequality in utilities (as measured by the expected Gini-coefficient) under the implemented policy is increasing in political polarization. In particular, partisanship preserving transformations of the electorate that decrease the difference in the parties' strengths increase the expected ex-post inequality in utilities of the implemented policy. Hence, for a given level of partisanship, the expected ex-post inequality in utilities is maximized when the parties are of equal strength. In addition, holding constant the difference in the parties' strengths, the expected ex-post inequality in utilities increases as the level of partisanship increases. That is, higher levels of partisanship and more symmetry in the parties' strengths generate inequality.
One related paper is Laslier (2002) . Laslier (2002) examines the issue of tyranny of the majority 6 in a model of redistributive politics with a segmented homogeneous electorate and certainty. 4 This interpretation is due to Grossman and Helpman (1996) . Probabilistic compromise can also be viewed as a system under which each party distributes a fraction of the budget, proportional to its representation in the legislature, according to its announced schedule. This approach is taken in Myerson (1993) . 5 For expected transfers this result holds regardless of party affiliation; for expected utilities it holds within each party. 6 Tocqueville describes tyranny of the majority as follows, "For what is a majority taken collectively if not an individual with opinions and, more often than not, interests contrary to those of another individual known as the minority. Now, if you are willing to concede that a man to whom omnipotence has been granted can abuse it to the detriment of his adversaries, why will you not concede that the same may be true of a majority?" (pp. 288-289)
intra-segment homogeneity in a party's offers. That is, within each voter segment, a party's offer distribution is assumed to be degenerate with all mass on the fixed offer for that segment (although offers may vary across segments). In this context, Laslier finds that there is no tyranny of the majority as long as there does not exist a segment that contains over half of the voters. However, if any segment contains over half of the voters, each party uses its entire budget on that segment, thereby freezing out the remaining voters.
Our model extends the Laslier model in two ways. First, we allow for a heterogeneous electorate, partitioned into distinct segments of homogeneous voters. Second, we allow for intra-segment heterogeneity in a party's offers, as represented by the (general, non-decreasing) segment specific offer distributions. Since our model assumes that the implemented policy is a probabilistic compromise of the parties' redistribution schedules, a natural analogue of "tyranny of the majority" is the degree to which the implemented policy tyrannizes a minority by driving them down to their reservation utility level. In our model this arises when the implemented policy freezes out voters by giving them an ex-post transfer of zero. 7 Indeed, under our assumption that the probability that a party's schedule is adopted is equal to the size of its vote share, the expected measure of the set of voters receiving a transfer of zero under the implemented policy is proportional to our measure of polarization. That is, polarization leads to tyranny. 8 A related literature follows from Cox and McCubbins (1986) , Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , and Londregan (1995, 1996) . Dixit and Londregan (1996, henceforth D-L) is perhaps 7 An alternative interpretation of tyranny of the majority refers to an outcome in which a majority receives a higher utility than some designated minority. In the equilibrium in our model, the expected utility, conditional on receiving a positive transfer in the implemented policy, is identical for all voters. Hence, among voters not frozen out there is a form of (conditional) equal treatment. However, within each party, the greater a voter's intensity of attachment, the lower his expected utility from the implemented policy. This arises because parties never freeze out their own loyal voters and the probability that a party's offer distribution freezes out an opposition voter is increasing in that voter's attachment. 8 This formulation of tyranny would not apply to Myerson's interpretation of probabilistic compromise as a system under which each party distributes a fraction of the budget, proportional to its representation in the legislature, according to its announced schedule. Under this interpretation, no voters would be frozen out ex post in the implemented policy. However, under the implemented policy the unequal treatment (in utilities) of the more loyal voter segments within each party would continue to hold.
closest to our paper in focus. Both papers assume voters derive utility from redistribution and party identification. 9 Both assume a heterogeneous electorate, partitioned into distinct voter segments. While D-L assume a non-degenerate distribution of voter attachments within each segment (represented by a segment-specific density), in our model voters within a given segment are homogeneous, so that parties are able to directly target voters by party affiliation and intensity of attachment. Moreover, like Laslier, D-L assume intra-segment homogeneity in a party's offers. That is, within each voter segment, a party's offer distribution is assumed to be degenerate with all mass on the fixed offer for that segment. This, together with intra-segment heterogeneity of voters, precludes the ability to directly target voters by intensity of attachment or party affiliation. That is, the D-L model examines a type of third-degree transfer discrimination. In contrast, our model allows for perfect discrimination by party affiliation and intensity of attachment. In addition, parties in our model may (anonymously) offer discriminate across the identical voters within the given segment by employing a (general, non-decreasing) segmentspecific offer distribution. Hence, our model features first-degree transfer discrimination.
In section 2 we present the model and characterize the unique Nash equilibrium of the game of redistributive politics with party identification. Section 3 explores the qualitative nature of the equilibrium and presents comparative statics results with respect to changes in measures of party strength, partisanship, and political polarization. Section 4 concludes. 9 Formally, the D-L preference structure may be viewed as a reduced form for one in which voters' preferences over parties are represented by utilities that are additively separable in the two aggregate variables, party identification and the redistributive transfer. The former subutility, corresponding to party identification, is determined by the (fixed) ideological positions of the party. The difference in the subutilities generated by the two parties determines the intensity of attachment of the voter to one of the parties. Throughout much of the D-L analysis the subutility of the redistributive transfer is assumed to be isoelastic in the transfer. In contrast, our preference structure can be viewed as a reduced form for one in which voter utilities are multiplicatively separable in the same two aggregate variables, with the subutility of consumption also assumed to be isoelastic.
Under these assumptions, all of our results on the properties of equilibrium transfers and vote shares, and in particular Theorem 1, hold. However, since the transformations of utility carried out to obtain our reduced form are generally not affine and vary across voter segments, some of our corollaries on the rankings of distributions of utility in the reduced form will generally fail to hold for other utilities representing the same ordinal voter preferences over the parties' offers.
The Model
Political Parties and the Legislature As is commonly assumed in the literature on electoral competition, the legislature implements a policy that is a probabilistic compromise of the parties' redistribution schedules. The policy that the legislature implements is a random variable which takes on party A's equilibrium redistribution schedule with probability equal to party A's equilibrium vote share and takes on party B's equilibrium redistribution schedule with probability equal to party B's equilibrium vote share.
Definition D.1:
The implemented policy is a random variable that takes on party A's equilibrium redistribution schedule with probability equal to party A's vote share and party B's equilibrium redistribution schedule with probability equal to party B's equilibrium vote share.
Voters
Voters are distinguished by the party with which they identify, if any, and the intensity of their attachment to that party. In this paper, we consider only distributions of voters' attachments to the political parties with support on a finite set of intensities of attachment. Let δ j i ∈ (0, 1) represent the number of units of the homogeneous good that party i must offer a loyal voter in its own loyal segment j in order to make that voter indifferent between the two parties when party −i offers one unit of the homogeneous good. 11 Thus, the utility that each loyal voter in party i's segment j receives from an offer of x A from party A is
Define a The fact that both of these utility functions represent the same preference over the two parties is sufficient to guarantee that all of our results on the nature of equilibrium transfers and vote shares, including Theorem 1, also hold for this multiplicatively separable utility function, as long as the set of ∆ Of course, our corollaries on the rankings of distributions of utility will generally fail to hold, since the transformations of utility carried out above generally are both not affine and vary across voter segments (even if we took them to be identical within a specific voter segment).
that each swing voter receives from an offer of x j from party j is
The measure of swing voters is
is a feasible distribution of voters' attachments to the political parties if n A and n B are finite, M A + M B ≤ 1, and m j > 0 for all j ∈ A ∪ B. An example distribution of voters' attachments to the political parties is shown graphically in Figure 1 .
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Each voter votes for the party that provides them the higher utility. Thus each swing voter votes for the party that makes them the higher transfer, while each loyal voter requires a proportionally higher transfer from the rival party in order to induce him to cross over.
Representation in the legislature is allocated proportionally. Thus, we normalize each party's representation in the legislature to be equal to the fraction of the votes received by that party.
One simple yet important summary statistic of a party's distribution of loyal voters is the sum across segments of each segment's intensity of attachment weighted by the measure of the set of voters in that segment.
Definition D.2:
The strength of party A is denoted by σ A ≡ j∈A m j a j A . The strength of party B is denoted by σ B ≡ k∈B m k a k B Several properties of this summary statistic should be noted. First, holding constant the size of each of a party's loyal segments, the party's strength is strictly increasing in the intensity of the attachment of any of these segments. Second, holding constant the intensity of attachment of each of its loyal segments, the party's strength is strictly increasing in the size of each of these segments. Finally, holding constant a party's size, the party's strength is strictly increasing as loyal voters shift from weaker intensities of attachment to stronger intensities of attachment.
Given the parties' strengths, σ A and σ B , it is useful to derive two simple measures for the distribution of voters' attachments to the political parties. 
Redistributive Competition
A strategy, which we label a redistributive schedule (or offer distribution), for party i is a set of cumulative distribution functions, 12 F j i j∈A∪S∪B , one distribution function for each segment j ∈ A of voters loyal to party A, the segment of swing voters S, and each segment k ∈ B of voters loyal to party B. As in Myerson (1993) each F j i (x) denotes the fraction of voters in segment j whom party i will offer a transfer less than or equal to x. The only restrictions that are placed on the set of feasible strategies is that each offer must be nonnegative and the set of cumulative distribution functions must satisfy the budget constraint:
Redistributive competition is the one-shot game, which we label
, in which parties attempt to maximize their representation in the legislature by simultaneously announcing redistributive schedules, subject to a budget constraint.
Optimal Strategies
The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium of the redistributive competition game. 12 In this case the focus is on the distributions within each segment (marginal distributions) rather than an n-variate joint distribution. As discussed in the appendix, an n-variate joint distribution is trivial to obtain and adds nothing to the problem analyzed here.
Theorem 1:
The unique Nash equilibrium of the redistributive competition game
is for each party i to choose offers according to the following distributions. For party A
Similarly for party B
. In equilibrium, party A's share of the vote is
and party B's share of the vote is
Proof: We begin by showing that this is an equilibrium. First, this is a feasible strategy since:
Then given that party B is following the equilibrium strategy, the vote share π A (·)
for party A, when it chooses to provide transfers according to an arbitrary strategy
is:
Since it is never a best response for party A to provide offers outside the support of party B's offers, we have:
But from the budget constraint given in equation (1) it follows that
which holds with equality if F j A j∈A∪S∪B is the equilibrium strategy. Thus party A's vote share cannot be increased by deviating to another strategy. The argument for party B is symmetric.
In the appendix, the strategic equivalence between two-party games of redistributive Note that each party's equilibrium vote share is increasing (decreasing) in its own (opponent's) party strength. In fact, since our game is constant sum, equilibrium strategies are maximin strategies and, from Theorem 1, party i can guarantee itself a vote share
The effectively stronger party (in the sense made precise in D.4) guarantees itself a majority (measure) of the votes. If σ i > σ −i , this then identifies the winning party in the analogous game in which the objective is not to maximize vote share but to obtain a majority of the votes. In this sense our results generalize the two-candidate results in Myerson (1993) . Of course, there may be many strategies which assure a party a majority. The strategies specified in Theorem 1 are those that arise if each party attempts to maximize its vote share among all those strategies that guarantee its value in the analogous majority rule game.
Party identification also creates an incentive for parties to utilize a poaching strategy which freezes out a portion of the opposition's loyal voters with a zero transfer, but gives the remaining opposition voters non-zero transfers which are higher in expectation than the opposition party's offers. A similar poaching effect has been addressed in the industrial organization literature on brand loyalty and brand switching. For example, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) 13 examine a duopoly model of brand loyalty and brand switching where firms try to poach the competitor's loyal consumers. The electoral poaching examined here differs from Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) in that the focus is on redistribution rather than short-term versus long-term contracts.
Transformations of the Electorate
We now apply Theorem 1 to explore the qualitative nature of the equilibrium and present comparative statics results with respect to changes in measures of party strength, partisanship, and political polarization. We begin with the nature of the equilibrium for a given distribution of voter attachments. In redistributive competition with heterogeneous voter loyalties, each party announces a distribution of offers for each segment of the electorate. In the discussion that follows we refer to the expectation of a party's equilibrium distribution of offers over a segment as that segment's equilibrium expected transfer from the party's redistribution schedule.
A segment's equilibrium expected utility from the party's redistribution schedule is similarly defined, as are both the equilibrium expected transfer and utility from the implemented policy.
Despite the fact that from Theorem 1 the parties' equilibrium redistributive schedules differ in all segments of loyal voters, for each segment, the expected transfer from each party, and thus from the implemented policy, is the same. Furthermore, for a given distribution of voters' attachments to the political parties, the expected transfers are highest for the swing segment and are strictly decreasing in the intensity of attachment to a party. Thus, voters with the 13 See also Lee (1997) .
highest intensity of attachment receive the lowest expected transfers and swing voters receive the highest expected transfers. However, the poaching strategies utilized by the parties freeze out a portion of the opposition party's loyal voters with a zero transfer, and offer the remaining portion of the opposition party's loyal voters non-zero transfers which are higher in expectation than the opposition party's transfers. For each segment, conditional on receiving a positive transfer from the opposition party the expected transfer from the opposition party is equal to the expected transfer of the swing segment.
Corollary 1: Within any given voter segment, the expected transfers from the two parties are identical. For a given distribution of voters' attachments to the political parties, the expected transfers are strictly decreasing in the intensity of attachment (regardless of party affiliation). Conditional on receiving a positive transfer from the opposition party, within each loyal voter segment the expected transfer from the opposition party is equal to that of the swing voter segment.
Proof: From Theorem 1 the swing voters equilibrium expected transfer from each party and from the implemented policy E S (·) is
Similarly, for each segment j ∈ A of party A's loyal voters the equilibrium expected transfer from each party and from the implemented policy E j (·) is
Conditional on receiving a positive transfer from party B, for each segment j ∈ A of party A's loyal voters the equilibrium expected transfer from party B E
The argument for voters loyal to party B is symmetric. Q.E.D.
The swing voter segment is the most contested segment since neither party has an advantage, and, thus, the equilibrium transfers are the highest in this segment. The presence of voter loyalties to the political parties creates an incentive for the parties to target or poach a subset of the opposition party's loyal voters. However, as a segment's intensity of attachment increases it becomes more difficult for the opposition party to induce a voter in that segment to vote against their party. Thus, the proportion of a segment's loyal voters that the opposition party targets with non-zero transfers is decreasing in the intensity of attachment. As the more attached segments are targeted less by the opposition, the affiliated party optimally diverts resources away from its most attached loyal voter segments to the other segments. This result is independent of the measures of the segments and the parties' strengths.
One difference between our results on expected transfers and the analysis of the resulting utilities is that for loyal voters the expected utilities from the affiliated party's redistribution schedule are higher than the unconditional expected utilities from the opposition party's redistribution schedule. In fact, the expected utility that each segment of loyal voters receives from the affiliated party's redistribution schedule is equal to the expected utility that the swing voters receive from either party's redistribution schedule. In addition, conditional on receiving a positive transfer, the expected utility that each subset of loyal voters receives from the opposition party's redistribution schedule is also equal to the expected utility that the swing voters receive. Thus, since the proportion of a segment's loyal voters that is targeted with non-zero transfers is decreasing in the intensity of attachment, the unconditional expected utility that each segment of loyal voters' receives from the opposition party's redistribution schedule is strictly decreasing in the intensity of attachment. From Corollary 1, this is equal to the expected utility for swing voters, EU S = E S .
The second part of the corollary follows from the fact that for each segment j ∈ A of party A's loyal voters the equilibrium unconditional expected utility from the opposition party's redistribution schedule, EU
Q.E.D.
In fact, the equivalence between loyal voters' utilities from the affiliated party's redistribution schedule, the targeted loyal voters' utilities from the opposition party's redistribution schedule, and the swing voters utilities from both schedules is stronger than stated. The distribution of loyal voters' utilities from the affiliated party, the distribution of targeted loyal voters' utilities from the opposition party, and the distributions of swing voters utilities from both parties are identical.
Given these static properties of the equilibrium transfers and resulting utilities we now examine comparative statics with respect to transformations of the electorate. We will focus mainly on two simple transformations of the electorate. The first, a partisanship preserving transformation of the electorate, reflects a change in the symmetry of the parties' strengths while holding the level of partisanship constant. The second, an effective party-strength preserving transformation of the electorate, reflects a change in the level of partisanship while holding the absolute difference in the parties' strengths constant. These two types of transformations are represented graphically in Figure 3 . In (σ A , σ B ) space, for a given level of partisanship, the set of partisanship preserving transformations forms a line with slope of −1, and for fixed effective party strengths, the set of effective party-strength preserving transformations forms a line with slope of +1.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Another transformation that we examine is one that holds constant or fixed the intensities of the attachment to parties, while shifting the electorate across the given set of intensities. The following corollary examines how, given fixed intensities of attachment, partisanship preserving and partisanship increasing transformations of the electorate change each voter segment's expected transfers and utilities. Proof of the corollary follows directly from Corollaries 1 and 2.
, a partisanship preserving (resp., increasing) transformation of the electorate that leaves the intensities of attachment,
, fixed leaves invariant (resp., increases) the expected transfer and utility received from each party's redistribution schedule by voters within a given voter segment j ∈ A, k ∈ B, or S. The characterization of equilibrium poaching also raises the question of how changes in voter loyalty to political parties affect the inequality arising from equilibrium redistribution schedules. Remarkably, the comparative statics analysis of changes in inequality in the distribution of transfers is considerably more complex than the analysis of changes in the distribution of utilities. The Lorenz curves for the distributions of transfers arising from each party's redistribution schedule are piecewise quadratic functions that depend critically on each parameter in the distribution of voters' attachments to the parties. The kinks in these curves make it difficult to obtain unambiguous comparative statics results. It turns out that comparative statics results on the inequality in utility are more straightforward. Corollary 6 addresses inequality in the distribution of utilities arising from each party's equilibrium offer distribution as measured by the Gini-coefficient of inequality.
Corollary 6: For each party i = A, B, the inequality (as measured by the Ginicoefficient of inequality) arising from the party's equilibrium redistribution schedule is increasing in the opposition party's strength. More precisely, the Gini-coefficient of party i's equilibrium redistribution schedule is
Proof: From Theorem 1, the measure of the set of voters who receive a utility level from party A's equilibrium redistribution schedule that is less than or equal to x is
By definition the Lorenz curve forF A is
which is equivalent to
.
By definition, the Gini-coefficient forF A is
Simplifying we have C A = Party i has an incentive to target a different proportion of the voters from each of party −i's loyal segments. As the intensity of attachment of a given segment of −i's voters increases, the proportion of that segment that receives a transfer of 0 increases. As a result, the aggregate inequality in party i's equilibrium redistribution schedule increases.
More generally, as Corollary 6 states, any change in the distribution of voters' attachments to the political parties that leads to an increase in the strength of party −i, results in an increase in the aggregate inequality of party i's equilibrium redistribution schedule. Moreover, freezing out by party i increases in the sense that the measure of party −i's loyal voters that receive a transfer of 0 from party i increases.
Given the assumption that the legislature implements a probabilistic compromise of the parties' equilibrium redistribution schedules, we can also examine the expected utilities and the expected ex-post inequality of utilities from the implemented policy. To measure changes in the expected utility from the implemented policy, we must take into account changes both in the Proof: From Theorem 1, for each segment j ∈ A of party A's loyal voters the equilibrium expected transfer from the policy implemented by the legislature
which is increasing inσ A and thus decreasing inσ B = −σ A . The argument for voters loyal to party B is symmetric.
The second part of the corollary follows from the fact that for each segment j ∈ A ∂EU j ∂σ > 0.
The argument for swing voters and voters loyal to party B follows directly. Q.E.D.
The implications of these results for the expected ex-post inequality of utilities from the implemented policy are examined in the following corollary. We use the expected Gini-coefficient to measure expected ex-post inequality and refer to the expected Gini-coefficient as the "aggregate inequality." Proof: From Corollary 5, the aggregate inequality arising from the implemented policy is
Simplifying we have
The first and third parts of the corollary follow directly. The second part follows from the fact that for a given level of partisanship, σ, I (σ A , σ B ) is maximized when
Hence, for a given level of partisanship symmetry in party strength generates inequality. Similarly, for given effective party-strengths, partisanship generates inequality.
Our results on party strength and inequality are closely related to issues arising in the literature on polarization. 14 Although much of this literature deals with the distribution of income, its tenets can be adapted to our context of redistributive politics. An interesting question that arises is whether there is a simple measure, of "political polarization," defined over the primitives of the model, with the property that the aggregate inequality from the implemented policy is increasing in the measure. It turns out that the answer is yes. Indeed, we base this measure solely on the party strengths. Setting
it is easily demonstrated that the aggregate inequality in utilities arising from the implemented policy is increasing in P (·, ·).
Corollary 9:
The aggregate inequality in utilities arising from the implemented policy is increasing in the measure of political polarization P (σ A , σ B ).
14 See for example: Esteban and Ray (1994), Wolfson (1994) , Wang and Tsui (2000) , and Rodriguez and Salas (2003) .
The level curves of the political polarization measure and the aggregate inequality of utilities from the implemented policy are shown in Figure 4 below.
[Insert Figure 4 here] Several properties of these level curves should be mentioned. First a level of partisanship defines a 'budget' line over possible combinations of party strengths. Thus, the properties of aggregate inequality from the implemented policy addressed in Corollary 8 can be seen graphically in Figure 4 . Second, given that the parties have symmetric strengths, an increase in either party's strength increases polarization and thus aggregate inequality. That is
Furthermore, for σ i < 1 2 + σ −i , a small increase in party i's strength increases the aggregate inequality arising from the implemented policy. That is
For σ i > 1 2 + σ −i the effect on aggregate inequality is reversed. That is, increasing the strength of a party that already had a sufficiently large effective strength decreases aggregate inequality.
Our results on inequality and political polarization are closely related to the incentive, 
Conclusion
This paper extends Myerson's (1993) model of redistributive politics to allow for heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. Parties segment voters by the party with which they identify, if any, and the intensity of their attachment, or "loyalty," to that party. We find that voters pay a price for party loyalty. For a given distribution of voters' attachments to the political parties, in the implemented policy, the segment of swing voters has the highest expected transfer and expected utility, and the expected transfers and utilities for loyal voter segments are strictly decreasing in the intensity of attachment. Using our measure of "party strength," based on both the sizes and intensities of attachment of a party's loyal voter segments, we demonstrate that each party's representation in the legislature is increasing (decreasing) in its own (opponent's) party strength. In addition, parties poach a subset of the opposition party's loyal voters, in an effort to induce those voters to vote against the opposition party. The level of inequality in and the size of the set of opposition party voters frozen out by a party's equilibrium redistribution schedule are increasing in the opposition party's strength.
We also develop a measure of "political polarization" that is increasing in the sum and symmetry of the party strengths, and find that aggregate inequality is increasing in political polarization. That is, higher levels of partisanship and more symmetry in the parties' strengths generate inequality. In addition, the expected measure of the set of voters that receive a zero transfer (and, hence, their secure utility level) from the implemented policy is increasing in the level of political polarization. In this sense polarization increases tyranny.
There are several potential directions for future research based on our model that appear to be particularly fruitful. The model can be applied to shed light on topics previously studied in the redistributive politics literature, such as candidate valence issues. In addition, this paper's focus on identifiable voter segments is immediately applicable to the study of transfers targeted by geographical region or other identifiable characteristics. Sahuguet and Persico (2006) establish an equivalence between the two-party model of redistributive politics and an appropriately chosen two-bidder all-pay auction. We now extend this result to establish an equivalence between the two-party model of redistributive politics with segmented loyal voters and an appropriately chosen set of two-bidder independent simultaneous all-pay auctions.
We begin by reviewing the characterization of n simultaneous two-bidder all-pay auctions with complete information. Let 
Since each auction is independent, the unique equilibrium is for each bidder to choose F j i as if auction j was the only auction. The case of a single all-pay auction with complete information is studied by Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock, de Vries (1996). Thus, for each auction j and bidder i we have the following three cases:
In addition, without a binding cap on bids, there is no reason to construct an n-variate distribution function from these marginal distributions. 15 Now consider two-party redistributive competition with segmented loyal voters, and assume that the parties face the budget constraint
15 Without a binding cap on bids, it is trivial to construct an n-variate distribution since any n-variate copula is sufficient. Given the Fréchet-Hoeffding bounds for n-variate copulas, the range of sufficient n-variate copulas is quite large. For this reason the n-variate joint distribution adds nothing to the problem analyzed here. See Nelson (1999) for an introduction to copulas.
where F j i represents party i's distribution of offers for voters in segment j and m j > 0 is the measure of voters in segment j such that j∈A∪S∪B m j = 1. In the discussion that follows the notation for the intensity of loyal voter attachment is modified in the following way: for each segment j ∈ A ∪ S ∪ B if j = S, the swing segment, or j ∈ B, one of party B's loyal voter segments, then a 
We can now proceed to the proof of the equivalence between the two-party model of redistributive politics with segmented loyal voters and an appropriately chosen set of two-bidder independent simultaneous all-pay auctions. In the discussion that follows,s Proof: The proof, which is contained in the following lemmas, is instructive in that it establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium given in Theorem 1.
The first three lemmas follow from lines drawn by Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996). 
But, from lemmas 2 and 3, it follows that
for all x ∈ 0,s j i , and The following lemma establishes that there exists a unique λ that satisfies the budget constraint.
Lemma 6:
There exists a unique value for λ, and this value is 1− j∈A m j (1−δ 
Q.E.D.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
To construct the unique Nash equilibrium of the redistributive politics game, note that the intensity of attachment parameters, a 
